The Big Picture – what is really at stake with the START follow-on Treaty

by Alicia Godsberg

There is cause for cautious optimism after Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed their START follow-on Joint Understanding in Moscow last Monday – the goal of completing a legally binding bilateral nuclear disarmament agreement with verification measures is preferable to letting START expire without an agreement or without one that keeps some sort of verification protocol.  The Joint Understanding leaves some familiar questions open, such as the lack of definition of a “strategic offensive weapon” and what to do about the thousands of nuclear warheads in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.  But so far few analysts on either side of the nuclear debate have been talking about the big picture, what for the vast majority of the world (and therefore our own national security) is really at stake here – the viability of the nonproliferation regime itself. 

Why will the follow-on treaty to START have such a great impact on the entire nonproliferation regime?  Simply, the rest of the world is looking for the possessors of 95% of the global nuclear weapon stockpiles to show greater effort in working toward their nuclear disarmament obligation under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  The NPT is both a nonproliferation and disarmament treaty, and at the NPT Review Conferences (RC’s) and Preparatory Committees (PrepCom’s) the Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties (NNWS) continue to voice their growing concern and anger over what they perceive to be lack of real progress on nuclear disarmament.  At the PrepCom this past May those voices – including many of our closest allies – spoke loudly, stating that continued failure by the NWS to work in good faith toward their nuclear disarmament obligation could eventually break up the nonproliferation regime, spelling the end of the other part of the Treaty’s bargain: the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Just to put things in perspective, NNWS are every country in the world except the five NWS (US, Russia, UK, France, and China) and the three countries that have never signed the NPT (Israel, India, and Pakistan – with a question now about the obligations of North Korea and without including Taiwan, which is not recognized by the United Nations).  While the NPT has an elaborate mechanism to verify the compliance of NNWS with their nonproliferation obligations under the Treaty (i.e. the IAEA and its Safeguards Agreements), there are no institutionalized means to monitor or enforce compliance with the disarmament obligation of NWS under Article VI of the Treaty.  And while some NWS are now proposing further restrictions on NNWS nuclear energy programs through preventing the spread of sensitive fuel-cycle technology, NNWS are increasingly voicing their frustration over nuclear trade restrictions while greater progress on nuclear disarmament remains in some distant future.  Further fueling this distrust of the NWS and of new technology transfer restrictions was the Bush administration’s ill-advised US-India nuclear cooperation deal, seen by many NNWS as “rewarding” India with an exception to nuclear trade laws and export controls while India continues to operate its nuclear programs largely outside the NPT’s nonproliferation regime and its oversight and restrictions.

This blog is not meant to weigh in on the controversy surrounding the inalienable right of NNWS to nuclear technology under Article IV of the NPT, but rather to state the fact that a series of what are perceived as broken promises by NWS to NNWS has led the regime to approach what many have seen as a breaking point.  Some of those promises include the ratification of the CTBT, strengthening of the ABM Treaty, and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.  These promises have special significance, as they were part of political commitments made to get the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, thereby removing any small pressure NNWS might have been able to place on NWS to meet their disarmament obligation by threatening not to renew the Treaty at future RC’s. 

The US has a special role to play in this drama for two reasons.  First, the US is the second largest possessor of nuclear weapons in the world and as such needs to be at the forefront of nuclear disarmament for that goal to be taken seriously and eventually come to fruition.  Second, President Obama has publicly reversed some positions of President George W. Bush on nuclear disarmament and the world is waiting to see if his vision will be translated into action by the US.  For example, at the 2005 NPT RC the Bush administration stated it would not consider as binding any of the commitments made by prior US administrations at previous RC’s, such as the commitment to the “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate nuclear weapons and the commitment to work toward ratifying the CTBT.  Contrast that with Obama’s policy speeches, especially the one in Prague on April 5, 20009 in which he placed a high priority on US verification of the CTBT and on his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and you can begin to understand the feeling of hope surrounded by a continued atmosphere of mistrust that pervaded the United Nations in May.

A recent New York Times op-ed[i] pointed out that there is no guarantee the US Senate is going to go along with President Obama’s nuclear policy vision, and he may in fact encounter difficulty ratifying the CTBT and gaining support for the reductions outlined in last week’s Joint Statement.  In a June 30 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal,[ii] Senator Kyl and Richard Perle voiced this side of the debate, stating:

There is a fashionable notion that if only we and the Russians reduced our nuclear forces, other nations would reduce their existing arsenals or abandon plans to acquire nuclear weapons altogether… this is dangerous, wishful thinking.  If we were to approach zero nuclear weapons today, others would almost certainly try even harder to catapult to superpower status by acquiring a bomb or two.  A robust American nuclear force is an essential discouragement to nuclear proliferators; a weak or uncertain force just the opposite.

This fear mongering, unsupported by the facts, is the type of rhetoric that will confuse the debate once any START or CTBT-related issues hit the Senate floor.  In a world where reductions would still leave actively deployed nuclear warheads in the thousands – with thousands more on reserve – “superpower status” will not be achieved by acquiring “a bomb or two.”  Think about North Korea – are they a “superpower” now that they have exploded two nuclear devices and we know they are continuing to work on their nuclear weapon program?  Hardly.  Instead, they are international outcasts, condemned even by China for their latest atomic experiment, and have become weaker still in their attempt to achieve international status.  And if the US, the country with the most powerful and advanced conventional forces, needs a “robust” nuclear force to protect its national security and fulfill security commitments, then it seems that any country with a weaker conventional force (which is everyone else) should seek nuclear weapons.  So, I would argue exactly the opposite Senator Kyl and Mr. Perle, and say that a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in US security actually lessens the case for other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons, which are more costly both economically and politically than conventional forces.

Whether the US can restore the faith of the rest of the world in our leadership on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament by meeting previous political commitments and working toward fulfilling Treaty obligations remains to be seen.  Rose Gottemoeller’s remarks to the 2009 NPT PrepCom at the UN in May were well received by the global community, but NNWS also made clear that words need to be followed by concrete actions.  The US needs the cooperation of the global community to continue the success of the nonproliferation regime, which has been largely successful over the past 39 years minus the few notable failures.  To do this, the US must understand that the follow-on treaty to START will directly impact the perception the rest of our global community has about the seriousness of our commitment to the NPT.  That is because the NPT is both a disarmament and nonproliferation treaty; if the US recognizes and acts on this truth, it will be able to achieve the urgent goal of regaining its leadership position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

 


[i] Taubman, Philip. “Obama’s Big Missile Test.” Editorial. New York Times 8 July 2009.

 

[ii] Jon Kyl and Richard Perle. “Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent.” Editorial. Wall Street Journal 30 June 2009.

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3 Responses to “The Big Picture – what is really at stake with the START follow-on Treaty”

  1. stephan upton July 16, 2009 at 5:32 am #

    “Bush administration’s ill-advised US-India nuclear cooperation deal..”

    Ill advised? I thought that was the only thing the moron got right in 8 years in office..

  2. Sean October 15, 2009 at 8:36 pm #

    Why hasn’t this earned a response from FAS or those who continually give Russia and China a pass when it comes to nukes

    “Boston Globe
    October 15, 2009
    Russia Reserves Right To Conduct Preemptive Nuclear Strike
    Say US, NATO pose threat of aggression
    By David Nowak, Associated Press
    MOSCOW – A top Russian security official says Moscow reserves the right to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes to safeguard the country against aggression on both a large and a local scale, according to a newspaper interview published yesterday.
    Presidential Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev also singled out the United States and NATO, saying Moscow’s Cold War foes still pose potential threats to Russia despite what he called a global trend toward local conflicts.
    The interview appeared in the daily Izvestia during a visit by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, as US and Russian negotiators try to hammer out a nuclear arms reduction treaty by December. It also came amid grumbling in Moscow over US moves to modify plans for a missile shield near Russia’s borders rather than ditch the idea outright.
    Patrushev said a sweeping document on military policy including a passage on preventative nuclear force will be handed to President Dmitry Medvedev by the end of the year, according to Izvestia.
    Officials are examining “a variety of possibilities for using nuclear force, depending on the situation and the intentions of the possible opponent,’’ Patrushev was quoted as saying. “In situations critical to national security, options including a preventative nuclear strike on the aggressor are not excluded.’’
    The proposed doctrine would allow for the use of nuclear weapons “to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even local war,’’ Patrushev was quoted as saying. He said a government analysis of the threat of conflict in the world showed “a shift from large-scale conflicts to local wars and armed conflicts.’’
    “However, earlier military dangers and threats for our country have not lost significance,’’ he was quoted as saying. “Activity on receiving new members into NATO is not ceasing. The military activity of the bloc is being stepped up. US strategic forces are conducting intensive training on using strategic nuclear weapons.’’
    Russian military analysts said the hawkish former domestic intelligence chief’s remarks were mostly muscle-flexing for show, because what he revealed about the proposed new doctrine suggests it differs little from the current one.
    One independent analyst, Alexander Golts, said current policy already allows for a nuclear strike to repel an aggression of any sort.
    Another, Pavel Felgenhauer, said that effectively allows for a preemptive strike because the type of aggression that would warrant such a strike is not clearly defined.
    Russia’s NATO envoy, Dmitry Rogozin, argued the proposed doctrine does not contradict arms reduction efforts.
    Still, Patrushev’s focus on local conflicts could rattle Georgia, the small neighbor that Russia routed in a five-day conventional war with Russia last year.”

    How many offensive wars has NATO launched in 60 years vice Russia/ USSR?

    If the U.S. made this remark it would be plastered everywhere.

    Who has reduced their nuclear arsenal the most since 1991?

    Who has modernized their arsenal the most since then?

  3. Alicia Godsberg October 16, 2009 at 9:37 am #

    Sean,
    The Boston Globe picked up on this story and in arms control circles the news of a new nuclear policy review in Russia has been widely reported and discussed. The US is also conducting a nuclear posture review, due by the end of the year, which has been reported on and commented on quite a bit in the media and arms control community. In terms of “modernizing” nuclear arsenals since 1991, one has to be careful about defining terms – it is fair to say, however, that one could argue that all the nuclear powers are “modernizing” their nuclear weapons when looked at from a certain angle. Russia does not have the type of stockpile stewardship program the US does and its warheads were not designed as well as ours were in terms of longevity – thus they have always been, and continue to be, (in one way or another) “under construction” on a regular basis. Reductions in nuclear forces between the two largest holders of nuclear arsenals is an important end in and of itself – important for strengthening the NPT (and thus compliance on nonproliferation), important for world stability and international peace and security. But it is, however, only one step in a process to toward those goals and one that desperately needs to be guided by more sane nuclear policy from the top down, especially in the US and Russia. While the comments from Russia regarding their upcoming nuclear policy sound belligerent, it is important to note that the rhetoric of politics is one thing (especially during the meetings in the UN this month of the General Assembly’s First Committee on disarmament) and actual policy is another. Let’s hope the nuclear posture reviews in Russia and the US end up significantly altering the Cold War policy of relying on large arsenals of nuclear weapons to strike large numbers of targets under a wide variety of scenarios (key word = hope).

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